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The European Union Policy for Investment addresses the issue of sustainable and 
inclusive development through the lens of private sector-led development. The policy 
looks at all forms of investment involving all types of firms. A good investment climate 
is one which provides opportunities for all investors: public and private, large and small, 
foreign and domestic. The policy could be non-prescriptive, as it is impossible to find an 
approach that suits all the countries within the EU. The Member States have different 
private sector development and economic sustainability and efficiency. The policy 
recognizes the role of competition in relation to the principle of non-discrimination and 
national treatment. The importance of foreign investment is directly linked to the fact 
that the EU is the biggest provider and destination of FDI in the world, measured by 
stocks and flows. The investment creates enormous growth and numerous new jobs both 
at home and abroad. 
 
1. History of the Foreign Direct Investment in the European Union 
 
The biggest push to the foreign direct investment flow started with the collapse of 
communism more than 20 years ago. This event unleashed a historically unprecedented 
process of economic restructuring and political transformation in the former communist 
countries. Of course, it was a lengthy process which did not happen over a year: there 
was a transition period.2 This transition process involved certain changes in the politics 
and in the economies of the countries involved. As an example, we can mention 
democratization, institution building and for the economic sector, - marketization, 
liberalization, restructuring. In the transition process, FDI proved to be the most effective 
instrument.  
Further studies on the economics of the 2004 Enlargement3 have shown that this 
prospect of accession has been paramount in mobilizing foreign investments, as western 
firms responded to the opportunities offered by the opening of the new markets by 
changing the geographical organization of their production thus initiating a broader 
process of restructuring for the European industry. As a result, these movements were 
part of a deeper integration process, reflecting the significant linkages that developed on 
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the ground, which in turn facilitated sizeable technology transfers to the companies of 
Central and Eastern Europe. But the extent of integration with the local economies has 
been low, and this was related to the volumes of FDI. The countries were seeing foreign 
direct investment as a market-capture type and a spatial reorganization of the production 
system. The latest major step in FDI policy happened in 2009 with the Treaty of Lisbon, 
which changed the perspective of future developments entirely by giving the Union full 
competence over foreign investments. 
 
2. The Treaty of Lisbon and the Member States’-BITs: the conflict and how the EU 
regulated them 
 
Many years ago, with the establishing of the European Union (previously European 
Economic Community/European Community) a Common Commercial Policy (CCP)4 
has been created to govern the EU’s trade relations with non-EU countries. The creation 
of a common commercial policy was a logical consequence of the formation of a customs 
union among its Member States. The European Union's trade policy therefore establishes 
common rules including, among others, a common customs tariff, a common import and 
export regime and the undertaking of uniform trade liberalization measures as well as 
trade defense instruments.  
The biggest change within the FDI policy of the EU was brought by the Treaty of 
Lisbon in 2009, which gave the EU power, within the framework of the CCP, to make 
investment agreements on behalf of the Member States. In terms of new competences, 
the Lisbon Treaty5 explicitly mentions “foreign direct investment” as forming part of the 
EU common commercial policy.6 This includes, among others, the power to regulate 
investment protection. In addition, the Lisbon Treaty explicitly confirmed that the 
common commercial policy is an area of exclusive EU competences. This formal 
declaration confirms existing case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Union 
(hereinafter the CJEU)7and means that the Union alone is able to legislate and conclude 
international agreements in this field, including international investment.  
In this case, one question arises: What to do with Member States’ Bilateral 
Investment Treaties (BITs)? Over the last 50 years, the Member States of the EU 
concluded a large number of such bilateral agreements (see Figure 1). There are two 
types of BITs: treaties between Member States and third countries and; intra-EU 
agreements. 
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Figure 1 
Overview of the number of Bilateral Investment Treaties concluded by Member 
States 
Source: COM(2010)343 final8 
 
The Regulation 1219/12 of the European Parliament and Council on establishing 
transitional arrangements for bilateral investment agreements between Member States 
and third countries (hereinafter the Regulation) addresses the steps that should be taken 
about existing bilateral investment agreements. It states that the bilateral agreements 
signed before 1st December 2009 can be maintained in force, or enter into force, in 
accordance with the Regulation. In addition, a few obligations are engaged for the 
Member States: to take necessary measures to eliminate the BIT’s incompatibilities with 
the Union law; to amend or conclude BITs in accordance with Union law and to 
cooperate with the negotiations or the conclusion by the Union of a BIT with third 
countries.   
As a general rule, the Member States should get the Commission’s authorization to 
open formal negotiations with third countries. The Commission may require the Member 
State to supplement or remove from such negotiations and from the prospective bilateral 
investment agreement any clauses necessary to ensure consistency with the Union’s 
investment policy or compatibility with Union law. 
As for the intra-EU BITs, the main problem was that they were incompatible with the 
fundamental principles of the EU, more precisely, conflicts arose from restrictions on 
the free movement of capitals and protections granted for investment in BITs. According 
to the European Commission, those provisions of the Bilateral Investment Treaties were 
causing discrimination among Member States which were not parties in those treaties. 
According to the CJEU case-law, discrimination based on nationality, as declared by the 
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EU Treaties9 and confirmed by the case-law of the CJEU,10 is incompatible with EU law. 
Thus the Union came up with the general regulation for all bilateral investment 
agreements of the Member States. 
Intra-EU bilateral investment agreements face more problems than the agreements 
with third countries. The European Commission has made a bold commitment to proving 
that intra-EU BITs are infringing Union law. The arguments that were presented by the 
Commission are as follows:11 
 The principle of lex posterior, which requires Member States to take actions 
against conflict between EU law and earlier treaties in their domestic law; 
 The principle of supremacy of EU law, which means that EU law prevails over 
treaties concluded between EU Member States;  
 Availability of equivalent investment protection under EU law; 
 The principle of non-discrimination under Article 8 TFEU, which prohibits any 
discrimination on the grounds of nationality; 
 The violation of State aid rules under EU law; 
 And lastly, the exclusive jurisdiction of the CJEU on interpreting EU law and 
that an arbitral tribunal is not competent to seek preliminary ruling from the 
CJEU.  
In response to the arguments of the Commission, the Member States presented the 
problems arising from termination of their bilateral investment agreements. Firstly, 
European Union investors would lose their right to benefit from the advantages of 
international investment arbitration for disputes arising out of their investment in a 
European Union Member State. The only available solution would be national courts. 
Thus the investors would not have complete confidence in their investments in Member 
States. Secondly, a number of intra-EU BITs stipulate a sunset clause, which allows 
protected investors to enjoy substantive and procedural protection under the BIT upon 
its termination for a specified period of time. And lastly, Union law has no equivalent 
substantive protection to intra-EU BITs since the latter generally provide a broader scope 
of protections, as pointed out by Advocate General Wathelet in the Achmea v. Slovakia12 
preliminary ruling. 
 
3. Other novelties of the approach of the European Union towards Foreign Direct 
Investment 
 
Besides having conflicts about previous multilateral and bilateral agreements of the 
Member States, the EU also had some new visions about FDI. 
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The two major agreements that EU is working on are the CETA (Comprehensive 
Trade and Economic Agreement) with Canada and the TTIP (The Transatlantic Trade 
Investment Partnership) with the USA.  
CETA is a new trade agreement between the EU and Canada. On 21 September 2017 
CETA entered into force provisionally.13 As such, most of the agreement now applies. 
National parliaments in EU countries – and in some cases regional ones too – will then 
need to approve CETA before it can take full effect. In the case of TTIP, the trade and 
investment negotiations with the US are in process since 2013. 
The EU has recently made clear that it is determined to move away from its previous 
system of investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS), as its ad hoc nature does not 
sufficiently guarantee impartiality and predictability. That is why, after a long and 
thorough debate with all relevant stakeholders, the EU replaced ISDS in all its 
negotiations with a permanent Investment Court System.14 The Commission says that 
the Investment Court System in EU trade and investment agreements already addresses 
all the main shortcomings identified in the old ISDS system. But due to its bilateral 
nature, it only applies to the specific parties to each agreement. It can’t address the 
problems outlined above at a global level. For example, it does not cover the many 
Member States’ agreements. Moreover, it would be much more efficient to have just 
one, multilateral institution to rule on investment disputes covered by all the bilateral 
agreements in place. 
The proposal for the new court system includes major improvements such as:15 
 a public Investment Court System composed of a first instance Tribunal and an 
Appeal Tribunal would be set up; 
 judgments would be made by publicly appointed judges with high 
qualifications, comparable to those required for the members of permanent 
international courts such as the International Court of Justice and the WTO 
Appellate Body; 
 the new Appeal Tribunal would be operating on similar principles to the WTO 
Appellate Body; 
 the ability of investors to take a case before the Tribunal would be precisely 
defined and limited to cases such as targeted discrimination on the base of 
gender, race or religion, or nationality, expropriation without compensation, or 
denial of justice; 
 Governments’ right to regulate would be enshrined and guaranteed in the 
provisions of the trade and investment agreements. 
This builds on the EU’s existing approach which ensures: 
 proceedings will be transparent, hearings open and comments available on-line, 
and a right to intervene for parties with an interest in the dispute will be 
provided; 
 Forum shopping is not possible; 
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 Frivolous claims will be dismissed quickly; 
 A clear distinction between international law and domestic law will be 
maintained; 
 Multiple and parallel proceedings will be avoided. 
 
4. Conclusions 
 
It can take decades to finally stabilize the investment policy of the Union. The reform 
steps taken by the EU towards new regulations on investment have shown the Union’s 
determination.  Regardless of the, numerous problems, including previous, agreements 
that the EU is dealing with, the process itself is quite successful. After long-term 
negotiations, the multilateral agreements of the Union are waiting for approval from 
Member States’ Parliaments, and the proposal regarding the single judicial system is 
getting positive feedback from the observers. The single judicial system is striving to 
live up to the standards set by international tribunals’, and this is evidenced by the use 
of approaches developed by the WTO.  
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